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INTRODUCTION: TIERS ON THE REHNQUIST COURT
As Shakespeare might address Brutus: The fault is not in our
theories but in ourselves.' Pogo was more blunt-"we have met the
enemy and he is us."'2 There is no justification for the Rehnquist
Court's corruption of equal protection doctrine and the academy
must commit itself to the task of making that entirely clear.
The courts "scrutinize" law to make sure it does not violate equal
protection. Scrutiny comes in three tiers described as minimal, in-
termediate and strict, and is supposed to be most rigorous or "strict"
when core Fourteenth Amendment values are at stake. Most central
to the Fourteenth Amendment is the protection of African-
Americans. The Court wrote in Strauder v. West Virginid that "the
Fourteenth Amendment was framed and adopted... to assure to the
colored race the enjoyment of all the civil rights that under the law
are enjoyed by white persons, and to give to that race the protection
of the general government.. . . "'
It has been clear since Korematsu and Hirabayashi5 during World
War II that strict scrutiny must be applied to all claims of racial dis-
crimination. Nevertheless, the Court is not applying strict scrutiny
with any consistency in this area. Its language is strict-the justifica-
tion for distinguishing among people on the basis of race can only be
a compelling governmental interest, and even then the remedy must
be narrowly tailored to the specific problem.7 But the Rehnquist
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Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
6 Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995), cert. granted sub nom. Ada-
rand v. Mineta, 121 S. Ct. 1401 (2001), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 122 S. Ct. 511
(2001) (holding that "[flederal racial classifications [like those of a state] must serve a compel-
ling governmental interest, and must be narrowly tailored to further that interest").
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Court applies that theory only to claims of injustice to whites,8 not to
claims of injustice to blacks.9 This is not after the rational basis era
but very much part of it.
The Rehnquist Court has turned the command of the Fourteenth
Amendment on its head. There are three crucial areas where tiers of
scrutiny, designed to enforce the commands of the Fourteenth
Amendment, break down. First is the choice of the philosophical sys-
tem and goals that will structure how the tiers will be employed. The
philosophical system determines the values that will reside in the op-
posing rights and interests, and the relationships among them, as
they will be balanced among the tiers.
Second are the occasions for strict scrutiny, and the identification,
scope, and weighting of governmental interests as compelling. All
aspects of the tiers of scrutiny need to be specified precisely, or the
tiers lose their meaning and cease to be effective in distinguishing ac-
tions consistent with the guarantee of equal protection from those
that violate it. Without a clear approach to the treatment of compel-
ling interests, any action can be made important enough to override
the right to equal protection.
Third is the possibility of exiting the tiered structure via a detour
to intent. If the courts can avoid the structure of tiers by resorting to
an undefined language of intentions, the tiered structure is irrele-
vant. The Rehnquist Court has attacked the tiered structure of equal
protection jurisprudence from all three directions. This Essay will
begin with the detour by way of intentions, move through the Court's
goals and philosophical choices, and then explore the way this Court
has used tiers and whether those tiers can be tightened.
I. INTENTIONS
The alchemy that allows the substitution of minimal scrutiny
where strict scrutiny seems to be called for is the "intent test."" The
' See, e.g., Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320 (2000) (holding that Section 5 of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 does not prohibit preclearance of a redistricting plan enacted
with a discriminatory but nonretrogressive purpose); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996) (apply-
ing strict scrutiny to invalidate redrawing of Congressional districts creating racial/ethnic mi-
nority districts); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995) (holding Georgia redistricting plan vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause).
See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996) (holding that for a defendant to
be entitled to discovery on a claim that he was prosecuted on the basis of race, strong statistical
evidence of discrimination is insufficient and the defendant must first identify the similarly situ-
ated defendants of other races who were not prosecuted); see alsoJoan Biskupic, Provisions: Civil
Rights Act of 1991, 49 CONG. Q. 3620 (1991) (discussing the findings, purpose, and new reme-
dies for discrimination).
" See Stephen E. Gottlieb, Reformulating the Motive/Effects Debate in Constitutional Adjudication,
33 WAYNE L. REV. 97 (1986) (explaining the way the intent test has muddied the meaning of
equal protection).
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Court held in Washington v. Davis" that "our cases have not embraced
the proposition that a law or other official act, without regard to
whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitu-
tional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact."
12
Since Davis, violation of the Equal Protection Clause has been de-
fined by the purpose or intentions of the governmental body or offi-
cial taking action. The notion of intentions, however, is not clearly
defined. As the Court continued in Davis- "Necessarily, an invidious
discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the
relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the law bears more
heavily on one race than another.",
3
The Court understood that a discriminatory purpose may have to
be inferred from the surrounding facts, and implicitly accepted the
conclusion that determinations of discrimination will have to be a
matter of judicial judgment. One cannot look into the mind of an-
other and glean that individual's purposes. Thus, Davis posed the
problem of how thatjudicial judgment is to be informed and operate.
Intentions may be proven either by statements or by effects. 4
Statements have become rare since the days of blatant resistance to
school integration have passed, and the Court has often been loath to
credit such statements as authoritative. 5 Thus, the courts infer dis-
crimination from the absence of adequate reasons for the challenged
behavior. However, though not explicitly, that merely reposes the is-
sue of the proper tiers of scrutiny. It is clear that the Court will ac-
cept any and all explanations for actions challenged as racially dis-
criminatory. If the challenged practice were measured against the
tiers of scrutiny rather than the muddled concept of intentions, it
would clearly be evaluated using the rational basis test. Several ex-
amples should make the point.
In Hernandez v. New York,' 6 the prosecutor excluded all bilingual
individuals from the jury, explaining that jurors who spoke Spanish
might understand the witnesses' testimony without having to rely on
the official translator. Since most of us would view understanding the
witness as an advantage when sitting in the jury box, the Court, in ac-
cepting that as an explanation for a blatantly anti-Hispanic result, was
clearly not applying anything close to strict scrutiny. Indeed, if the
prosecutor's explanation was not a mere pretext, it surely could pass
only the most minimal scrutiny.
426 U.S. 229 (1976).
Id. at 239.
1' Id. at 242.
See id. (holding that discriminatory intent may be inferred from discriminatory impact).
See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (dismissing the state-
ments of a supervisor that the two segregated races in the company's cannery and offices would
not get along).
- 500 U.S. 352 (1991) (holding that a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to strike
two bilingual jurors did not violate the Equal Protection Clause).
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In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,17 the Court refused to draw any
inferences from the virtually complete racial segregation of the
workforce at an Alaska cannery, the segregation of its recruiting into
different communities, and the statement of a manager that the two
groups would not work well together. Again, its lenity can only be de-
scribed as minimal scrutiny.
In United States v. Armstrong,8 the Court refused even to allow a
United States district court to exercise its discretion to investigate
charges of racial discrimination, charges that an experienced judge
thought were worth pursuing. Instead of treating a pattern of dis-
crimination as needing scrutiny, the Court declined to scrutinize for
the most obvious explanation-that racial discrimination was at the
core.
Partly because of Wards Cove, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act
Amendments of 1991 and overruled nine cases in all.' 9 The original
Civil Rights Act of 1964 included provisions barring discrimination in
public accommodations, employment, and programs receiving fed-
eral funds. One of the provisions of the 1991 Amendments was to
make clear that when a plaintiff showed that a defendant's actions
produced a discriminatory effect, the defendant had the obligation to
explain and to give a good reason for those actions.20  The Voting
Rights Act of 1965 barred election rules that discriminated against
minorities and required that changes in voting rules in covered juris-
dictions be submitted to the Attorney General for approval.2' In the
Voting Rights Amendments of 1982, Congress changed voting rights
law in a way similar to its 1991 changes to the Civil Rights Act in order
to clarify the need to explain discriminatory effects The Rehnquist
Court has been responding by challenging the constitutionality of the
results test. In the Voting Rights Act cases, the Court is close to find-
ing the results test unconstitutional, pointedly refusing to find that
"compliance with the results test" justifies relief,2' subordinating it to
federalism,24 and refusing to allow any relief if a racial classification's
" 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (requiring that the plaintiffs demonstrate specific elements of the
employer's practices that significantly impacted nonwhites in order to prove a prima fade case
of disparate impact).
" 517 U.S. 456 (1996) (holding that a defendant claiming prosecutorial racial discrimina-
tion must make a threshold showing that the government declined to prosecute similarly situ-
ated suspects of other races in order to be entitled to discovery).
" Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
2 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1) (A) (i) (2001).
" Voting Rights Act of 1965,42 U.S.C. § 1971 (2001).
Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2001).
" See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 961-76 (1996) (affirming the district court's holding that
the congressional districts were unconstitutional because race was the predominant factor in
drawing each of the districts).
2' See Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 336 (2000) (affirming the district court's
holding to grant preclearance of respondent's redistricting plan despite the fact that the plan
was enacted with a discriminatory but nonretrogressive purpose).
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primary purpose is to correct the racial underrepresentation which
triggered the application of the Voting Rights Act.25 The results test
is, after all, explicitly racial. The remedies it implies are also explicitly
racial. Both are unacceptable to this Court. In other words, while
the results test of the Voting Rights Act has not been found unconsti-
tutional, its remedies have been. And since the Voting Rights Act it-
self is based on Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment but goes be-
yond the Court's interpretation of the provisions of Section 1, it
hangs by a slim reed. 6 In the Court's view, intentions define equality
to the exclusion of results.
The Court, however, infers racial intent to favor blacks from dis-
trict lines that follow racial boundaries or create some districts with a
majority of black voters-i.e., from the results.2 7 Even as a remedy,
the Court rejects those districting plans because they are, in its view,
intentionally discriminatory on racial grounds. But the Court does
not infer racial animus from district lines that give black voters fewer
districts in which they are the majority than black voters' proportion
of the population.28 The Court treats the two situations differently to
the extent that it finds one discriminatory and the other not, despite
the fact that the Court has recognized that districting is always done
with an awareness of race.29 To this Court, intentions can truly mean
anything.
II. THE COURT'S GOALS
The Court's goals are manifested in its equal protection jurispru-
dence. It is hard to find the limits of what the Court will allow to
happen to blacks because it has not found cases in which it could de-
fine those limits. The Court's expressed insistence on colorblindness
does not explain its refusal to see obvious discrimination. 30 The Con-
' See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 927 (1995) ("[T]he Justice Department's implicit
command that States engage in presumptively unconstitutional race-based districting brings the
Voting Rights Act, once upheld as a proper exercise of Congress' authority under § 2 of the Fif-
teenth Amendment [citation omitted] into tension with the Fourteenth Amendment.").
' STEPHEN E. GOTTLIEB, MORALITY IMPOSED: THE REHNQUIST COURT AND LIBERTY IN
AMERICA 111-12 (2000).
See, e.g., Vera, 517 U.S. at 972-76 (holding irregular shape can only be explained by race);
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 658 (1993) (holding segregation by race states an equal protection
claim).
' See, e.g., Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 913-15 (1996) (rejecting argument that a lower pro-
portion of black majority voting districts than their proportion of the population would be rea-
son enough to support a districting plan that would make up the difference); Miller, 515 U.S. at
923-24 (rejecting the same). In Bossier Parish School Board, 528 U.S. at 328-37, the Court held
that the districting plan did not violate the preclearance requirements of the Voting Rights Act
even though it was discriminatory.
"9 See Miller, 515 U.S. at 916 ("Redistricting legislatures will... almost always be aware of ra-
cial demographics....").
' Compare Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 212-31, 235-39 (1995), cert.
granted sub nom. Adarand v. Mineta, 121 S. Ct. 1401 (2001), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted,
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stitution requires government officers to be race-neutral in their deci-
sion making. Racial discrimination is obviously a breach of that con-
stitutional requirement. Thus, neither the Constitution nor the prin-
ciple of colorblindness requires judges to be blind to the misuse of
color.
To explore the goals of the majority of the Court more deeply re-
quires analyzing its members individually or in small groups. Justice
Rehnquist, who has served the longest, has opposed every form of de-
segregation and integration since he joined the Court.' Justice Scalia
has opposed the notion that society has any obligations to repair the
damage inflicted by centuries of discrimination. In a case dealing
with discrimination against gays and lesbians, Scalia, writing also for
Rehnquist and Thomas, suggested a view of discrimination that may
help to explain the harshness of their handling of racial discrimina-
tion cases. They made it clear that for them, protection against any
form of discrimination is itself a form of favoritism. Fat people, bald
people, and silly people are discriminated against by society. There-
fore, society should also be allowed to discriminate against gays and
lesbians. Nothing should be done to protect them. In other words,
whereas many people believe that the definition of neutrality or lack
of bias is to treat people without regard to the characteristic involved,
for Scalia, Rehnquist and Thomas, treating people that way is a form
of favoritism.33
Scalia also made that point in a private memo circulated among
the Justices in a case involving the discriminatory infliction of capital
punishment. He was reacting to a study by Professors David C. Bal-
dus, George Woodworth and Charles Pulaski that described the links
between the race of the victim, the race of the accused, and the im-
position of the death penalty.' Scalia wrote:
I disagree with the argument that the inferences that can be drawn from
the Baldus study are weakened by the fact that each jury and each trial is
unique, or by the large number of variables at issue. And I do not share
the view, implicit in [Powell's draft opinion], that an effect of racial fac-
tors upon sentencing, if it could be shown by sufficiently strong statistical
122 S. Ct. 511 (2001), and City of Richmond v. JA Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 521 (1989)
(ScaliaJ., concurring) (requiring colorblindness) with United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456
(1996), and Hernandez v. NewYork, 500 U.S. 352 (1991) (exhibiting blindness to the impact of
color).
" GOTTIEB, supra note 26, at 76-77.
Id. at 93-94.
See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 641, 645 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also
GOTTIEB, supra note 26, at 33.
See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286-87 (1987) (describing the Baldus study submit-
ted as an exhibit at trial); see also DAvID C. BALDus, GEORGE WOODWORTH & CHARLES A.
PULASKI, JR., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRIcAL ANALYSIS
(1989); David C. Baldus, George Woodworth & Charles A. Pulaski,Jr., Law and Statistics in Con-
flio: Reflections on McCleskey v. Kemp, in HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LAw (D.K. Kagehiro
& W.S, Laufer eds., 1992).
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evidence, would require reversal. Since it is my view that the unconscious
operation of irrational sympathies and antipathies, including racial, upon
jury decisions and (hence) prosecutorial [ones], is real, acknowledged by
the [cases] of this court and ineradicable, I cannot honestly say that all I
need is more proof.
a5
He concluded that racial discrimination in sentencing gave rise to
no rights.6 In effect, blacks, like gays, must take the world as they
find it, filled with prejudice and discrimination, even where life itself
is at stake. Consistent with that view, Scalia, Rehnquist, and Thomas
have all joined a number of opinions refusing relief even where there
was clear discrimination.s7
Along with his agreement that people should get no favoritism,
Thomas has invited some doubt about whether he objects to segrega-
tion so long as it is not mandatoryH In other words, a form of free-
dom of association seems to dominate his thinking in this area and
may, if limited to the rights of whites, affect the thinking of Rehnquist
and Scalia as well.
Justice O'Connor seems driven by a view of proper behavior-
one must jump through certain hoops to satisfy her. 9 She would not
categorically exclude all forms of assistance for disadvantaged blacks.
However, she insists on proof that plaintiffs are the specific blacks in-
jured by discrimination. Where discrimination was practiced gener-
ally throughout the society, such proof is very difficult to provide.
She eliminates generalized "societal discrimination" so that only
those blacks who overcame various hurdles to apply for the specific
opportunity in question might be compensated. In Croson, for exam-
ple, she wanted to know how many qualified minority-owned con-
tracting firms there were in Richmond.' If one could not move up
through the construction industry hierarchy in order to develop an
established contracting firm, however, then applying for specific con-
struction jobs only to be rejected would itself be beyond the horizon
" See Dennis D. Dorin, Far Right of the Mainstream: Racism, Rights, and Remedies from the Per-
spective oflustice Antonin Scalia's McCleskey Memorandum, 45 MERCER L. REV. 1035, 1038 (1994)
(quoting Memorandum from Justice Antonin Scalia to the Conference (Jan. 6, 1987) in
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (No. 84-6811), THURGOOD MARSHALL PAPERS, The
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.); see also DAVID A. SCHULTZ & CHRISTOPHER E. SMTrH,
THEJURISPRUDENTIAL VISION OFJUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA 195 (1996) (describing Scalia's reluc-
tance to use racial factors to reverse decisions).
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 291 (1987) (holding, in an opinion joined by Justice
Scalia, that evidence of discrimination in sentencing did not show discriminatory intent on the
part of any relevant persons or institutions).
37 See, e.g., Hernandezv. NewYork, 500 U.S. 352, 355 (1991) (Kennedy,J., plurality opinion)
(refusing relief on the basis of an ironic pretext); see also id. at 372 (O'ConnorJ., concurring in
the judgment).
GOTTLIEB, supra note 26, at 119-21.
Id. at 94-96.
City of Richmond v.JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 501-02 (1989) ("[W]here special quali-
fications are necessary, the relevant statistical pool for purposes of demonstrating discrimina-
tory exclusion must be the number of minorities qualified to undertake the particular task.").
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for blacks. Thus, the exclusion of generalized societal discrimination,
because of the difficulty of estimating its extent and targets, has had
the effect of excluding most if not all claims for relief. Her col-
leagues further insisted on identifying the specific acts and people re-
sponsible for the discrimination and tailoring relief only to their ac-
tivities. Justice O'Connor refused to shut the door that far, given the
difficulties of tracing exactly who hurt whom, but the burden she
placed on palliative measures was not considerably less.
4'
Justice Kennedy has joined most of the conservative group's rejec-
tion of relief for racial minorities. Where discrimination has been
found as a fact, however, he has been more prepared than some of
his colleagues to require relief. A prominent example is his opinion
prohibiting the use of peremptory strikes to exclude jurors on racial
grounds4  He has not defined anti-discrimination law as "favoritism"
in the way that Scalia, Rehnquist, and Thomas announced in discuss-
ing the treatment of gays and lesbians in Romer v. Evans.45 Indeed,
Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion in Romer, overturning an
amendment to the Colorado Constitution that would have banned
relief against discrimination to gays and lesbians. Justice O'Connor
joined the majority opinion as well. Similarly, Kennedy has not
joined Thomas and Scalia in their skepticism about differentiating
discrimination from favoritism in the voting rights cases." Neverthe-
less, like his more conservative colleagues, Kennedy requires strict
scrutiny for affirmative action, which favors minorities, while accept-
ing minimal explanations for decisions that injure minorities."
One wonders why this rejection of racial relief is so complete
among those five Justices. None of them has been particularly at-
tached to liberty in any other context save property.46 Freedom even
from unjust execution by the state seems not to bother the
Rehnquist-Scalia-Thomas trio.
47
Id. at 469 (relating the level of burden placed byJustice O'Connor).
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
517 U.S. 620, 636-53 (1996) (Scalia,J., dissenting).
SGoTruiEB, supra note 26, at 41-43.
4 Id-at 95-96.
Id. at 36-37.
, See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 339 (1995) (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting) (arguing that a
death-row inmate claiming that newly discovered evidence shows a miscarriage ofjustice should
have to produce "clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable
juror would [have found the petitioner] eligible for the death penalty" rather than the prob-
ability that he is innocent of the crime for which he is to be executed);Jacobs v. Scott, 513 U.S.
1067 (1995) (Stevens,J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (noting that the same prosecutor
who prosecutedJacobs presented an inconsistent claim about who actually committed the mur-
der at issue in prosecuting and obtaining a conviction of another individual for the same mur-
der); Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 403-05 (1993) (rejecting the "'probably' innocent" stan-
dard for allowing a district judge to consider evidence acquired subsequent to conviction and
determine whether further relief is warranted). All three are discussed in GOTriuEB, supra note
26, at 35-36, 207-08.
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There are several possible reasons. One is that these Justices are
loyal to their class and do not want to share with others. A second is a
fear of cultural miscegenation. There' is a strand of conservative
thought that finds it easier to inculcate "morality" in homogeneous
communities. In this view, all forms of integration threaten the mo-
rality of homogeneous communities where everyone is each other's
keeper and everyone is Big Brother. Privacy, of course, has never
been high on the agenda of this Court.4 9 Given the consistency of the
votes of this trio ofJustices on racial issues, it is impossible to exclude
the possibility that their racial views are related to their attack on
moral relativism.
Those goals-class and racial preferences-are in profound con-
flict with the Fourteenth Amendment. The expression of those goals
via tiers of scrutiny is mediated by the Justices' jurisprudential as-
sumptions-their rejection of relativism and possibly their preference
for homogeneous communities, their rough-and-tumble definition of
equality as equal vulnerability to prejudice and their assumptions
about racial inferiority.
In other words, the most likely conclusion to come from their
consistent antipathy to racial remedies and their rejection of what
they treat as moral relativism is that no approach to strict scrutiny
would have any significant effect on the Court's handling of racial
discrimination.
III. ALTERNATIVES AND THEJURISPRUDENCE OF TIERS
There is another reason why strict scrutiny of claims of racial dis-
crimination has become minimal scrutiny on the Rehnquist Court.
This Court is philosophically at odds not only with the objective, but
also with the method-the mode of reasoning-that strict scrutiny
embodies.
Strict scrutiny, the announced standard for cases involving racial
classifications, is the most exacting standard of review. The idea be-
hind strict scrutiny is that discrimination on the basis of forbidden
categories requires a particularly important justification. One of the
usual formulations of strict scrutiny is that members of protected
classes must be treated without distinction from others unless differ-
ential treatment is necessary to the achievement of a compelling gov-
" GOTTLIEB, supra note 26, at 58-59.
See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (majority opinion joined by Justices
Rehnquist, Scalia, and Kennedy holding that police use of low-flying helicopter to view mari-
juana growth in defendant's greenhouse did not violate Fourth Amendment); but see Kyllo v.
United States, 121 S. Ct. 2038 (2001) (majority opinion by Justice Scalia holding that use of
thermal imaging device to detect marijuana growth in private residence violated the Fourth
Amendment).
w GOTTLIEB, supra note 26, at 57-59.
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emiment interest, where the latter term is meant to identify only the
most important public purposes.
Intermediate scrutiny has generally been the standard applied to
claims of gender discrimination. Gender is not mentioned in Section
1 of the Fourteenth Amendment and was specifically rejected in the
discussions of the Thirty-Ninth Congress that wrote it. The Court has
concluded, however, that gender-based classifications now require
some judicial supervision. Unwilling to treat it in the same manner as
the race cases, however, the Court developed a middle category. The
usual formula is that discrimination on the basis of gender is not
permissible except where it would substantially further an important
government objective:
The State must show "at least that the [challenged] classification serves
'important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means
employed' are 'substantially related to the achievement of those objec-
tives.'" The justification must be genuine, not hypothesized or invented
post hoc in response to litigation. And it must not rely on overbroad gen-
eralizations about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of
males and females.
52
Rational basis or minimal scrutiny was formed in the argument
over the Court's intervention in economic issues in the early portion
of the twentieth century. The usual formulation is that the courts will
presume that government actions are constitutional if there is any
reason supporting them. Rational basis comes in at least two forms of
dental health-with and without "teeth." The Court described the
stronger version of the rational basis test in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center, Inc.:
To withstand equal protection review, legislation that distinguishes be-
tween the mentally retarded and others must be rationally related to a le-
gitimate governmental purpose. This standard, we believe, affords gov-
ernment the latitude necessary both to pursue policies designed to assist
the retarded in realizing their full potential, and to freely and efficiently
engage in activities that burden the retarded in what is essentially an in-
cidental manner. The State may not rely on a classification whose rela-
tionship to an asserted goal is so attenuated as to render the distinction
arbitrary or irrational.
In other words, the legislation must make sense to the Court. The
weaker, and more commonly applied, version was described in Wil-
liamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc.: "[T]he law need not be in
.. 51 See generally PUBLIC VALUES IN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAw (Stephen E. Gottlieb ed., 1993) (ex-
amining what constitutes public policy so compelling that constitutional rights may be sacrificed
to them, and exploring its significance and implications).
" United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (alterations in the original) (internal
citations omitted) (holding sex-based admissions policy of a publicly-funded university violated
Equal Protection Clause where Virginia failed to provide exceedingly persuasive justification for
the policy and failed to show that the policy was substantially related to the achievement of its
stated objectives).
"' 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985); see also id. at 455-60 (Marshall,J., dissenting).
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every respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional. It
is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it
might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a ra-
tional way to correct it."54
In other words, the law does not have to make sense to the
Court-it is enough that some others might think it rational. By ex-
ercising only minimal scrutiny, especially in the weaker version, the
Court defers to the other branches of government, often referred to
with some hyperbole and conceptual unclarity as the democratically
elected branches."
Together, these form the tiers of scrutiny. Their objective is to tie
the levels of scrutiny to the seriousness of constitutional concerns.
Minimal scrutiny minimizes judicial oversight and the time and re-
sources it takes to explain a decision to the courts, and makes it easy
for the other branches to function without judicial intervention
where they govern activities without special reason for concern about
official misbehavior. Intermediate and strict scrutiny, however, have
the Court evaluating government action skeptically and less deferen-
tially in those areas where there are special reasons for concern. One
well-known formulation for those special reasons for concern is that
they are areas where the democratic process predictably breaks
down.56 Since democratic self-government is one of the major justifi-
cations for law, there is less reason for the courts to restrain them-
selves from intruding where that process breaks down. And racial
prejudice tends to exclude minorities from participation in the
democratic process and to exclude them and their needs from con-
sideration by those who wield power.
All of these tiers of scrutiny are scales on which competing values
are balanced. In each case, the injury to the right involved is placed
on one side of the imaginary scale. On the other side, what is placed
on the scale depends on the applicable tier of scrutiny. In strict scru-
tiny, only the most important governmental objectives are allowed on
the scale, and even then only where the means are necessary to the
objective. In intermediate scrutiny, only important government ob-
jectives furthered by means substantially related to those objectives
are allowed on the scale. In minimal scrutiny, any rational notion,
348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955).
In some states of course, the judges are also elected though under somewhat different
selection provisions. See ROBERT JUSTIN LIPKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTIONS: PRAGMATISM
AND THE REVOLUTIONARY ROLE OFJUDICIAL REVIEW IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 8 (2000);
see, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 16; MONT. CONST. art. VII, § 8; N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 9; WASH.
CONST. art. IV, § 5; ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-903 (2000); GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-151 (2000); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:1872 (1999); MICH. COMP. LAWs§ 600.803 (2000); MISs. CODEANN. § 9-4-
5 (1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-05-02 (2000); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1901.07 (1998); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 14-5-610 (2000); TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-2-505 (2000) (providing for the election
ofjudges); see also MD. CONST. art. IV, § 5A, MO. CONST. art. 5, § 25(c) (1) (providing for judi-
cial retention elections).
' See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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sometimes described as anything that rational people might think ra-
tional, goes on the scale.
To understand the role that tiers of scrutiny play on the
Rehnquist Court, it is necessary to examine the philosophical struc-
ture of tiers of scrutiny. Tiers fit most comfortably within a conse-
quentialist jurisprudence. The crucial element is that the philo-
sophical approach allow or require some form of comparison.5 This
is minimized in Kantian jurisprudence, which is characterized by the
"categorical imperative" and attempts to be categorical rather than
comparative. Bruce Ackerman summarized this approach to law as
"the idea that Policymakers are not to conceive of their fellow citizens
as merely means to the larger end of maximizing social utility, but are
instead to treat them as ends in themselves."5  Even Kantian juris-
prudence, which was created in a search for absolutes, can allow
some comparisons-either between more or less of the same value or
between values of differing import 9 Consequential thinking extends
the point to a greater variety of values and circumstances. Utilitarian-
ism is a maximally consequentialist jurisprudence, allowing compari-
son of suite different harms and benefits among entirely different
people. Utilitarianism "insists that the sum of social satisfactions be
maximized."1 Tiers of scrutiny flow from such an approach because
tiers allow the comparison that consequentialism demands.62
" See Stephen E. Gottieb, The Paradox of Balandng Significant Interests, 45 HASTINGS LJ. 825
(1994) (exploring the way that formal approaches to law exclude balancing from the formal
argument but concluding that it is difficult to do something other than an intuitive compari-
son).
"BRUCEA. ACKEImAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 72 (1977). In a modem
translation, Kant's principle is rendered:
But suppose that there were something the existence of which in itself had absolute
worth, something which, as an end in itself, could be a ground of definite laws. In it and
only in it could lie the ground of a possible categorical imperative, i.e., of a practical law.
Now, I say, man and, in general, every rational being exists as an end in himself and not
merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will .... The practical imperative,
therefore, is the following: Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person
or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only.
IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 46-47 (Lewis White Beck
trans., Macmillan Publ'g Co. 1985) (1785).
" Ackerman suggests a kind of calculus for eminent domain cases based on Kantian think-
ing which provides considerable protection for property owners. See ACKERMAN, supra note 58,
at 72-73.
"There are, of course, numerous examinations of these ideas but one of the most interest-
ing and imaginative is that by Bruce Ackerman. See ACKERMAN, supra note 58, at 41-87.
", See id. at 71. Ackerman continues that utilitarianism's critics treat utilitarianism as indif-
ferent to the distribution of social satisfaction. Id. Utilitarians, however, tend to assume that
the marginal value of money goes up as its holders have less and therefore tend to urge redis-
tribution in a variety of ways.
"A "sliding scale," such as the one Justice Marshall proposed would, of course, do this at
least as well. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (1973) (Marshall,
J., dissenting); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 90 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Dan-
dridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,519-21 (1970) (Marshall,J., dissenting).
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Tiers of scrutiny distribute control over goals among the courts
and the agencies they supervise. The higher the level of scrutiny, the
greater the judicial control. All levels of scrutiny imply a balance be-
tween the harm caused by the violation of some protected right or in-
terest and the social purposes pursued over the damaged body of that
right or interest. At the more consistent end we can discern a phi-
losophy, ajurisprudence of ends and means.
It has long been noted that strict scrutiny flushes out bad mo-
tives.63 If the reasons given for trampling constitutional rights provide
poor justification, it is likely that the trampling was, in fact, based on
bad motives. It is unclear why it is necessary to reconvert the discov-
ery of good or bad results into the language of intentions. We might
have stopped and said that the results did or did not justify the
means, the loss of this or that constitutional liberty. But we reconvert
our findings into the language of intentions in some areas of law as
the result of the Court's decisions in such cases as Washington v.
Davis."
Reversing the same logic, strict scrutiny also flushes out judicial
assumptions. As the courts allow important rights to be trampled for
little gain, it discloses all too clearly a hierarchy of judicial purposes.
We can determine, as above, whether the courts treat discrimination
as an evil or a benefit, and whether they treat minorities as deserving
equal treatment or needing to justify the treatment they receive.
When the Court decided that a prosecutor was justified in dismissing
Hispanic jurors because they were bilingual and would be able to un-
derstand the witness without the aid of the translator, we might con-
clude that the justification was trivial, even wrongheaded given our
general ability to understand witnesses unaided, and conclude fur-
ther that the Court had treated discrimination as even less impor-
tant.6"5 Or when the Court rejected the standard of "probable inno-
cence" for ordering a hearing of a defendant awaiting execution, we
can conclude that finality is more important to the Court than life.6
A. The Weights on the Scales in a Consequentialist
Jurisprudence of Tiers
The crucial issues, therefore, are what weights are inserted in the
methodology. On the Court there are two large competing ap-
proaches with many variations. One of the competing approaches is
both consequentialist and utilitarian.6Y Consequentialism is, as its
0 See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 145-46 (1980); Gottlieb, supra note
10, at 105-07.
426 U.S. 229 (1976).
Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 361 (1991).
16Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993).
" See GOTTLIEB, supra note 26, at 87, 140, 160, 197.
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name implies, about consequences. What is good or bad is evaluated
by its consequences. With respect to equal protection in general, and
race in particular, consequentialists can look toward eradication of
differences (often called assimilation), toward pluralism, or toward
separation. Each is a state of affairs toward which some people might
work. They would then measure the quality of proposals according to
how well it brought about the chosen goal.
Utilitarianism is a specific type of consequentialism. Utilitarians
like those measures that result in the greatest human happiness and
the least pain.H Those who believe that human happiness will be
maximized by assimilation, pluralism, or tolerance can support varie-
ties of the contact hypothesis. 69 The idea behind the contact hy-
pothesis, which is "as American as apple pie," is that as people get to
know each other they learn to respect, even like each other and even-
tually to support each other. That is not always true of course. Con-
tact often breeds conflict. Social scientists have labored to find the
circumstances in which contact brings concord and those in which it
does not. But it is typical of Americans to believe that contact will,
eventually, erode hostility and result in some blending of manners
and ideas.70 Utilitarians who support diversity in some form are
therefore likely to support the contact hypothesis because they prefer
the consequences it is believed to produce.
Those who are concerned with a different set of consequences,
who are not utilitarian but who focus on the consequences for a spe-
cific group, or a stricter moralism more easily enforceable by homo-
geneous groups, may fear biological or cultural miscegenation. If
those are their fears, they must fear contact because it would bring
about what they fear. There is a strand of conservative thought that
leans in that direction" and that has never accepted the demise of
Plessy v. Ferguson.72 Each of those consequentialist versions fills the
scales with different values.
"See id. at 147-69.
See, e.g., GORDON ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 488-91 (1954); LAWRENCE CREMIN,
TRANSFORMATION OF THE SCHOOL: PROGRESSnSM IN AMERICAN EDUCATION, 1876-1957 10
(1964); PHYLLIS A. KATZ & DALMAS A. TAYLOR, ELIMINATING RACISM: PROFILES IN CONTROVERSY
360 (1988) (describing the contact hypothesis); HECTOR ST. JOHN DE CREECOEUR, LETTERS
FROM AN AMERICAN FARMER (E. P. Dutton, 1957) (1782); ISRAEL ZANGWILL, THE MELTING POT:
DRAMA IN FOURAcTs (Amo Press, 1975) (1932); Mark A. Ghesler, Contemporary Sociological Theo-
ries of Racism, in TOWARDS THE ELIMINATION OF RACISM 36 (Phyllis A. Katz ed., 1976); Gary Ger-
stle, Liberty, Coercion, and the Making ofAmericans, 84J. AMER. HIST. 524 (1997).
"I have described this at length in an article on Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954), prepared for appearance in the Suffolk University Law Review.
See GOTTLIEB, supra note 26, at 57-59, 75-76, 92-97.
7, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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B. The Weights on the Scales in an Ontological and/or Non-Situational
Jurisprudence of Tiers
Ontology is literally a study of the nature of existence. It refers to
what we think is natural. Ontological jurisprudence draws from ideas
about what is natural, inherent or inalienable, whether rights or law
or both. Such "natural" thinking can be consequentialist, but need
not be. If one believes that the golden rule expresses natural law or
right, it tends to be consequentialist. We would evaluate choices by
the consequences they bring for others or for society. The emphasis
is on substantive justice. In the scheme of John Rawls, differences in
the circumstances people enjoy require justification.3 This is inher-
ently consequentialist. Results count and define the justice of the
rules themselves.
Natural law or rights, however, can also be understood in a self-
regarding way.74 Self-regarding rules provide right-holders with op-
tions irrespective of the harm to others, i.e., regardless of the conse-
quences. That is perhaps the common way of thinking about natural
law or rights although it clearly does not need to be so. In this self-
regarding, nonconsequentialist way of thinking about law, the "jus-
tice" of the consequences is defined by the rule. The consequences
do not have a role to play in defining what should happen.
Procedural justice can mean the provision of a set of rules that
bind all who are in similar circumstances, and can mean further that
justice is thereupon satisfied, without more. This is also referred to as
formalism or formal justice. Procedural justice flows more easily
from the sef-revarding fork of natural law thinking. But which pro-
cedure counts? The immediate decision? A decision about alloca-
tions? A decision about the rules of the game? If substance counted,
then the crucial procedure would be the allocation procedure or the
decision about the rules of the game. But if substance does not
count, there may be no standard on which to base the choice of allo-
cation or rules, in which case any rule is as good as another and "the
cookies crumble" as they will. It is frequently said that it is often bet-
ter that one have rules than that the rules be good ones.76 That is the
essence of procedural justice, and it is clear, for example, in the writ-
ing of Justice Scalia. Indeed the title of one of his articles makes the
point unmistakably-The Rule of Law as a Law of RuleS. 77
If social shares are themselves natural, if they are preordained,
proper, earned, or protected, then there is no justification for provid-
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OFJUSTICE 103 (1971).
71 See Ian Shapiro, Notes Toward a Conditional Theory of Rights and Obligations in Property, in
STEPHEN E. GOTrlEB,JURISPRUDENCE: CASES AND MATERIALs 379 (1993).
7' See Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781, 787, 792
(1989);Joseph Raz, The Relevance of Coherence, 72 B.U. L. REV. 273, 301-02 (1992).
See, e.g., Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532,537 (1971).
56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175 (1989).
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The practitioners of formalism argue, however, against the inclu-
sion of consequences in any form.8 ' For them, any inclusion of con-
sequences results in a "living" Constitution that reflects the judges'
preferences rather than the founders' work.82 And in a perverse in-
trusion of consequentialism into their own theory, they argue that
consequential rules fail to bind the Justices themselves as well as for-
mal ones. Thus in Scalia's understanding, rules are more important
than good rules because the search for good ones unleashes the
judges andJustices. 83
IV. TIERS OF SCRUTINY ON THE REHNQUIST COURT
Tiers of scrutiny have perverse results on the Rehnquist Court for
several reasons. First, philosophically the Rehnquist Court proceeds
from nonconsequentialist a priori values. The a priori values pursued
by the Rehnquist Court leave little room for equality except as a pro-
cedural value. The conservative majority argues that equality is for-
mal, not substantive.84 With respect to affirmative action, for exam-
ple, the conservative majority believes there is and should be no
"difference between a 'No Trespassing' sign and a welcome mat."
85
There is no difference between benign and malignant distinctions.
The difference is only in the beholder.
Second, the Court has never moved beyond an ad hoc specification
of the elements of the compelling interest test. For that test to con-
strain decision making, it is necessary to specify what will engage each
of the levels of scrutiny, what will count as an interest of sufficient de-
gree, what the scope of those interests will be, and how they shall be
weighed. Absent these types of specificity, the tiers are simply an invi-
tation to roam at will among the maxims of constitutional law. Many
jurists and scholars have delved into specification of the rights that
might invoke the tiers of scrutiny.86 But the Rehnquist Court has re-
jected that scholarship,87 has continued to invoke varieties of elevated
" See, e.g., William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEx. L. REV. 693
(1976).
See id. (noting the interpretive aspects of formalistic theory).
SeeScalia, supra note 77, at 1175.
See, eg, Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 904-05 (1996) (stating the colorblindness principle);
City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 520-21 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(same); cf. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1071-72 (1996) (SouterJ., dissenting) (arguing against
the colorblindness principle).
SeeAdarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 245 (1995) (StevensJ, dissenting),
cert. granted sub nom. Adarand v. Mineta, 121 S. Ct. 1401 (2001), cert. dismissed as improvidently
granted, 122 S. Ct. 511 (2001); cf Vera, 517 U.S. at 1071-72 (SouterJ., dissenting).
' See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Corp., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see generally
ELY, supra note 63.
See, e.g., Croson, 488 U.S. at 494-96 (holding that the standard of review under the Equal
Protection Clause does not depend on the race of those classified).
[Vol. 4:2
TEARS FOR TIERS ON THE REHNQUIST COURT
ing anything else. If that were true, protection against discrimination
would be favoritism. Justice Scalia took this position in his dissent in
Romer v. Evans, arguing that everyone is subject to the prejudices of
others, and that protection from such prejudices is not equality but
favoritism.78 Thus formalism has consequences even as it argues
against taking consequences into account. Under a formal definition
of equal protection, it does not matter what happens or to whom it
happens, and no account of substantive justice can be allowed to in-
fluence the definition of equality. Thus, "invidiousness" should be
irrelevant to the choice of definition. Not only "affirmative action"
but anti-discrimination measures are affected by the distinction be-
tween formal and substantive justice because rules that do not men-
tion race become sanctified as "race-neutral," and explanations of ac-
tions that do not mention race are taken to mean that there were no
bad intentions, even though the rules and the explanations have, or
obscure, large impacts. On purely formal, procedural grounds, there
is no reason to prefer a different definition of discrimination. Indeed
there is not a "better" one. As Justice Thomas argued in Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, it all boils down to whose ox is gored, and
there is no standard by which to judge that.79
C. What Role Do Tiers Play in Nonconsequentialist Theory?
Tiers do not fit nonconsequentialist theory well. There are two
reasons. First, nonconsequentialist theory is definitional and deduc-
tive. There is not supposed to be anything to balance. Second, a pri-
ori values are not subject to criticism.
There can be space in definitions for consequences. Conse-
quences come in the form of analogies, and in the form of parades of
horribles. In other words, psychologically, consequences influence
definitions. But they remain theoretically concealed and hard to ar-
gue because they are not supposed to be there. Those who espouse
nonconsequentialism may yet incorporate consequences in their
thinking on occasion-even frequently.s It is not hard to demon-
strate the formalists' inability or unwillingness to exclude conse-
quences in practice.
517 U.S. 620, 641, 645 (1996) (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 241 n.* (1995) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring) (internal citations omitted), cert. granted sub nom. Adarand v. Mineta, 121 S. Ct. 1401
(2001), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 122 S. Ct. 511 (2001) ("It should be obvious that
every racial classification helps, in a narrow sense, some races and hurts others. As to the races
benefited, the classification could surely be called 'benign.' Accordingly, whether a law relying
upon racial taxonomy is 'benign' or 'malign,' either turns on 'whose ox is gored.'").
' See Glenn A. Phelps and John B. Gates, The Myth ofJurisprudenc" Interpretive Theory in the
Constitutional Opinions of Justices Rehnquist and Brennan, 31 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 567 (1991);
Glenn A. Phelps and Timothy A. Martinez, Brennan v. Rehnquist: The Politics of Constitutional Ju-
risprudence, 22 GONZ. L. REV. 307 (1987).
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scrutiny without a discerable plan88 and has regularly rejected
claims of right that would invoke heightened scrutiny despite strong
arguments to the contrary in fact and in prior law. 9 Some scholar-
ship has gone into the identification and source of interests as well as
the possibility of a link to rights.90 But the Court has continued to
discuss interests based on intuitions9 ' no more clear than Justice
Stewart's "I know it when I see it" procedure.92 And some scholarship
has also gone into the issue of the scope of values treated as compel-
' In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale 530 U.S. 640 (2000), the Court declined to use the compd-
ling interest test, refusing to treat homosexuals as a discrete and insular minority or as other-
wise requiringjudicial protection, although in Romerv. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), it seemed to
take the reverse stand. In Kimel v. Forida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000), the Court evalu-
ated congressional power over age discrimination by using the tiers of scrutiny and refused to
find age discrimination sufficiently harmful tojustifi national legislation.
" In Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. 471 (1999), the Court de-
clined to find that non-citizens had an interest in equal protection of the law, though the Court
had protected aliens from deprivations of equal protection in previous cases. See, e.g., Nyquist v.
Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977) (holding New York lav denying financial aid for education to resi-
dent aliens not seeking naturalization violated the Equal Protection Clause); Hampton v. Mow
Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976) (holding the Civil Service Commission's law excluding non-
United States' citizens and non-natives of American Samoa from employment in most civil serv-
ice positions violated Equal Protection Clause); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915) (holding
Arizona law requiring that eighty percent of an employer's workforce be United States' citizens
violated Equal Protection Clause). In Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377
(2000), the Court continued to wear blindfolds about incumbency advantages that it first put
on in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), and so failed to credit the importance of the claim be-
ing raised or the need to evaluate it under elevated scrutiny. In City of Boerne v. Rores, 521 U.S.
507 (1997), the Court discounted the record of religious discrimination. And in United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), the Court discounted the record of state failure to handle vio-
lence against women.
90 See PUBLIC VALUES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 51; Symposium, When Is a Line as
Long as a Rock Is Heavy? Reconciling Public Values and Individual Rights in Constitutional Adjudica-
tion, 45 HASTINGS LJ. 707-1120 (1994); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Individual Rights and the
Powers of Government, 27 GA. L. REV. 343 (1993); Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental
Interests: An Essential but Unanal)ed Term in Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U. L. REV. 917
(1988).
9' See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000) (judgment about the size of appropriate
bubble zone around abortion clinics based on the significance of confrontational and harassing
conduct); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (basing determination of the constitutionality
of a visitation order partly on judgment about the constitutional status of the best interests of
the children); Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999) (basing constitutionality of state law partly on
the constitutional status of state reasons for imposing residential criteria for welfare benefits);
Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997) (basing holding on the state's public interest in outlawing
physician-assisted suicides); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (basing determina-
tion of the constitutionality of Iavs prohibiting physician-assisted suicides on the importance of
the states' interests in preventing such suicides). In the Voting Rights Act cases, the Court has
been unwilling to decide whether compliance with the Voting Rights Act qualifies as a compel-
ling government interest, a conclusion which is particularly remarkable because the Act prohib-
its the "denial or abridgment" of the right to vote, a provision which would track the require-
ments of the Fourteenth Amendment except for the Court's insistence on distinguishing
between intent and reality. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2001); Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541
(1999); Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74 (1997); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996); Bush v.
Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
n Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (StewartJ., concurring).
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ling,93 but that too depends on the Court's willingness to specify the
process more completely.
Third, tiers of scrutiny are completely undermined by reversion to
an undefined version of intentions analysis that is equivalent to
minimal scrutiny or the rational basis test.9 The application of rules
that provide no mention of race suffice to convince this Court that
the crucial boundary of bad intentions has not been crossed. Thus, it
was able to find that hiring different racial and ethnic populations in
different locations for work at an Alaskan cannery, though resulting
in a segregated workforce, was not discriminatory because the rules
made no mention of race or ethnicity.95 The Court was able to find
that it was not racial discrimination to dismiss two Hispanic jurors be-
cause it could be explained, however trivially, in terms that did not
mention race or nationality, as excluding bilingual jurors who would
not rely on the official translator but instead would rely directly on
the witnesses' testimony.5 Formally neutral rules give this Court the
ability to ignore substantive inequality. Its blindness to consequences
is repeated in such areas as the First Amendment's religion clauses,
where the evenhanded enforcement of rules with very uneven effects
on people of different faiths has seemed entirely appropriate, with
little need for justification.7
In these ways, the Rehnquist Court has dismantled any notion of
substantive equality, rejected affirmative action categorically, and
dismissed charges of discrimination. Conversely, tiers of scrutiny are
very helpful to this Court in striking down any attempt to ameliorate
the condition of racial minorities. The Court requires strict scrutiny
of any effort to redress racial discrimination under the Voting Rights
Act. The result has been that multiracial districts have been voided as
racial segregation and as unconstitutional gerrymanders even though
voiding them left racial minorities with less than a proportional share
of electoral power. The Court also requires strict scrutiny of efforts
to redress racial discrimination through set-aside programs. In effect,
the Court defines colorblindness, in goal and in remedy, as the pre-
eminent value, and notices the breach only on behalf of white com-
plainants, and therefore substantive justice fails the comparison.
Tiers of scrutiny work in combination with a formal or procedural ju-
risprudence to deny the power of substantive justice.
See Roger Craig Green, Interest Definition in Equal Protection: A Study ofJudicial Technique,
108 YALE L.J. 439 (1998).
See, e.g., Cromartie, 526 U.S. at 541; Abrams, 521 U.S. at 74; Shaw, 517 U.S. at 899; Vera, 517
U.S. at 952.
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991).
See generally Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHi. L. REV. 115
(1992).
See Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320 (2000); Vera, 517 U.S. at 952; Shaw, 517
U.S. at 899; Miller v.Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
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V. CAN TIERS BE TIGHTENED?
Roger Craig Green has proposed an ingenious improvement in
the precision of tiers of scrutiny.9 By linking the levels of generality
of government interests to the relatedness and importance prongs of
the levels of scrutiny, and by insisting that the courts look for interests
at those points of intersection, he proposes to develop a less malle-
able approach to the treatment of public interests. And by formaliz-
ing concepts of required interests and forbidden interests, which are
implicit in the law, he proposes to make equal protection jurispru-
dence much richer and more reliable than it now is.
This Court, however, has not acted in the ways that it has because
of the ambiguity of these concepts; instead, it has rejected them.
Within any doctrinal and philosophical tradition, it is surely possible
to describe likely and unlikely implications-in other words, to be
able to predict with reasonable assurance how most cases will turn
out. But the philosophical tradition of the Rehnquist Court is a di-
rect repudiation of the philosophical traditions of its predecessors.
Indeed, some of what drives Green's analysis is his own evaluation of
critical values like impartiality in elections-values that the Rehnquist
Court consistently rejects." Green's proposal is a good workout for a
Court committed to the values it has inherited. For the Rehnquist
Court, it is either an irrelevance or a tool to make very different deci-
sions from those Green envisions.
VI. BUSH V. GORE
The Court's morally bankrupt approach to equal protection as a
formal, empty doctrine could not have been demonstrated better
than in Bush v. Gore."' The Court noted that there were indeed equal
protection problems among the voters in Florida. 02 Some voters
might have had their votes counted if their chads were merely dim-
pled, others if they hung by two comers, still others if they hung only
by one. That picture is a simplification since it was not clear that the
single Florida judge whose job it was to oversee the ballots would have
left it at that, or if the Florida Supreme Court would have either."0 '
See Green, supra note 93, at 454-59.
,o Id. at 464.
531 U.S. 98 (2000).
02 Id. at 105-11.
"' See Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1262 (Fla. 2000) (ordering the Florida circuit court to
commence the tabulation of voter ballots immediately and to order statewide relief simultane-
ously); Order on Remand at 3, Gore v. Harris, No. 00-2808 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 9, 2000) (prescrib-
ing procedures for the counting of untabulated presidential ballots in Miami-Dade County and
"in all other counties that have not conducted a manual recount or tabulations of the non-votes
or undervotes"). See also Gore v. Harris, 773 So. 2d 524, 534 n.23 (Fla. 2000) (Pariente, J., con-
Jan. 2002]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
But the United States Supreme Court passed over those details and
noted that a problem of equal protection had developed.
10 4
In other voting cases before the Rehnquist Court, the Court has
protected only the rights of over-represented white voters and of
political parties.06 The Court did not break precedent here. Noting
the denial of equal protection if the voting continued, the Court de-
nied those voters whose ballots for president had not been counted
by the machines any votes at all'0 7 as if that solved the problem. The
Court did not solve the equal protection problem. Instead, it created
other problems of equal protection. First, there is the difference be-
tween those voters who had their votes counted by machine and
those who did not.0 8 Some assert that the problem was in the voters'
misbehavior,"° but that, of course, is precisely the factual matter the
resolution of which the Court prevented. Second, there was the dif-
ference among the uncounted voters themselves, since the difference
between those voters whose votes should have been counted and
those whose votes should not was also obscured by this method.
Third, it resolved these problems of equal protection by the same
method it commonly uses for complaints lodged by blacks-it denied
relief."0 And that denial makes the finding of inequality hypocritical,
curring) ("I remain confident that if the recount had continued in a timely manner, any obvi-
ous disparity in counting votes would have been reviewed by Judge Terry Lewis whose initial
order on December 8, 2000, demonstrated an orderly and objective approach to the recount
procedures.").
Bush, 531 U.S. at 103.
See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1007, 1040-41 (1996) (Stevens,J., dissenting) (provid-
ing the statistical information regarding Texas' redistricting plan demonstrating that blacks and
Hispanics comprised a third of the state population, that there had been five Hispanic and
black representatives out of twenty-seven under the prior districting plan, to which the state
added three "minority-majority" districts in the proposed thirty district plan); Miller v.Johnson,
515 U.S. 900, 906-07 (1995) (describing that 1990 Census indicated a black population of
twenty-seven percent but striking down a districting plan that provided black majorities in two
out of eleven districts or approximately fourteen percent).
"6 See, e.g., Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604,
608 (1996) (explaining that the First Amendment prohibits limits on the amount of "an expen-
diture that the political party has made independently without coordination with any candi-
date").
'w Bush, 531 U.S. at 108 (noting that a manual recount would count the votes of citizens
whose votes for one candidate were not registered, yet a recount would still exclude the un-
readable ballots of citizens who had voted for two candidates); see also i& at 147 (Breyer, J., dis-
senting) (noting that the halt of manual recount "ensur[es] that the uncounted legal votes will
not be counted under any standard.., harm [ing] the very fairness interests the Court is at-
tempting to protect").
" Id at 127 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority ignored an unknown number
of voters whose ballots revealed their intent but were rejected by machines); id. at 147 (Breyer,
J., dissenting).
," See Michael Griffin, Don't Expect Sweeping Election Reform as Lawmakers Prepared for Battle,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, February 26, 2001, at Al (noting Florida House Speaker Tom Feeney's
opinion that Florida's election woes rested more with voters who made mistakes than mechani-
cal breakdowns).
"0 Bush, 531 U.S. at 110 (reversing the order of the Supreme Court of Florida that the re-
count proceed).
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for if there was a denial of equal protection, then there was a predi-
cate for relief.
But this Court treats votes with as little reverence as it treats
blacks; perhaps it is even less reverent when the votes are cast by
blacks, though it may not have mattered in this event. Put another
way, the Court's action shows that the values of equality and electoral
rights have little value on this Court's scales.
CONCLUSION: CAN THIS COURT BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY?
Bush v. Gore makes clear the Court's lack of interest in the substan-
tive values that are supposed to be measured by the tiers of scrutiny.
Even taking the Court on its own rhetorical terms produces little of
value. Procedural justice is hard to evaluate but by its consequences.
The result is that this Court's procedural values are hollow with re-
spect to race.
Tiers of scrutiny are a vessel into which the Justices pour their val-
ues. It is not a system that produces logically necessary results. The
problem, however, is not with the theory; it is with the people and
their refusal to share, accept, or enforce the values that the nation
has expressed in its Constitution and laws on these issues.
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